RECENT CASES
ESTABLISHMENT OF EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS
BY COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT
The manipulation of conceptual language in legal instruments for the purpose
of camouflaging the true nature of business transactions and jural relationships
is often a tribute to the legal profession's ingenuity and, occasionally, to its
sense of humor. Employers, particularly, stimulated by the expensive legal consequences of the employment relationship, have sought to insulate themselves
from these consequences by turning their employees into independent contractors. Some recent cases, however, portend the demise of the capitalists'
monopoly in this limited but fascinating field. Organized labor, it appears, has
discovered the scrivener.
Following the passage of workmen's compensation and unemployment insurance statutes and the Social Security Act, numerous cases arose concerning the
coverage of dance-band musicians. Since all of these statutes placed tax liability
on the "employer," it became necessary to determine who "employed" the
sidemen'-the band leader, or the operator of the establishment (i.e., the dancehall, restaurant, theater, etc.) at which the band performed. Applying the control test, courts frequently held that band leaders were independent contractors.2 Thus, the band leader, as an employer, was not only beyond the
beneficial coverage of the acts, but he was burdened with the task of meeting
the required assessments. This unsatisfactory state of affairs propelled the
American Federation of Musicians into action. As the unfavorable decisions
had turned on the fact that the establishments had no right to exercise control
over the band members, the union devised a contract, known as Form B, which
purported to grant this right to the establishments.3 Band leaders were required
by the union to use Form B exclusively when contracting with establishments.
Miss O'Meara, a member of the Federation, was an organist in a four-piece
dance band. Her leader, through a booking agency, obtained a thirteen-week
I

The term "sidemen" designates all members of an orchestra exclusive of the leader.
In general, see 158 A.L.R. 9x5 (1945) and notes 7 and 8, infra.

3The pertinent provisions of Form B are as follows: "....

[The] employer employs the per-

sonal services of the employees severally, and the employees severally, through their representative, agree to render collectively to the employer services ... according to the following terms
and conditions: ...The employer shall at all times have complete control of the services
which employees will render.... On behalf of the employer, the Leader will distribute the
amount received from the employer to the employees, including himself.... The amount paid
to the Leader includes the cost of transportation.... The employer hereby authorizes the
Leader... to replace any employee who.., does not perform any or all of the services provided for under this contract." Bartels v. Birmingham, 67 S. Ct. 1547, 1549 (1947).
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engagement with the Earle Restaurant, Inc. The Form B contract was signed
by the band leader, the booking agent, and a representative of the restaurant.
While performing at the restaurant, Miss O'Meara was injured through the
negligence of a waiter. In a subsequent tort action, the defendant restaurant
contended that its liability was limited to workmen's compensation, and offered
the contract of hire in evidence to prove that the plaintiff was, in fact, its employee. The district court excluded this document on the finding that the plaintiff was ignorant of its contents. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held
the exclusion erroneous on the ground that the contract was binding on the
plaintiff if made by her validly authorized representative. EarleRestaurant,Inc.
v. O'Meara.4
The courts have almost unanimously sought to determine the employment
status of musicians through application of the common law control test. In
applying this test, a distinction has been drawn by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue s and, somewhat less articulately, by the courts, 6 between so-called

"name" bands and "non-name" bands. Examples of the former type frequently
possess all of the attributes of independent entrepreneurial units. Their personnel remains intact over long periods of time, during which they ordinarily
perform at numerous establishments for relatively short engagements. Sidemen
are often under long-term contracts with their leaders providing for fixed weekly
salaries regardless of the number of performances given. The profitability of a
name band depends largely on the ability of the leader to select competent
musicians, drill them into a state of high discipline, devise unique orchestrations, and sell the band to the public. Thus, when a night club or restaurant
hires such an organization, it purchases the services of a going concern. Since
any interference on the part of the establishment with the mode of performance,
and particularly with the selection of personnel, will damage the artistry of the
ensemble, effective "control" is out of the question. Name bands are therefore
generally regarded as independent units.7
4 16o F. 2d 275 (App. D.C., 1947).
5See i Prentice-Hall Social Security Tax Serv.
6

33,786.75 and 33,786.76.

See cases cited notes 7 and 8, infra.

7Bartels v. Birmingham, 67 S.Ct. 1547 (1947); Palmer v. Michigan Unemployment Com-

pensation Comm'n, 3io Mich 702, i8N.W. 2d 83 (1945); In re Roseland Amusement Co.,
269 App. Div. 713, 54 N.Y.S. 2d 173 (1945); Spillson v. Smith, 147 F. 2d 727 (C.C.A. 7th,
'945); In re Muni, 266 App. Div. 1052, 44 N.Y.S. 2d 924 (1943); Biltgen v. Reynolds, 58 F.
Supp. 909 (Minn., x943); Williams v. United States, 126 F. 2d 129 (C.C.A. 7th, 1942); People
v. Grier, 53 Cal. App. 2d 841, 128 P. 2d 207 (1942). Contra: In re Rogavin's Claim, 259 App.
Div. 774, 18 N.Y.S. 2d 302 (1940).

Under some state unemployment insurance acts, a presumption of employment arising
from services for wages may be rebutted only by showing that a) the individual is free from
control, b) his service is outside the usual course of business of the person hiring him, and c)
he is customarily engaged in an independent calling. In these jurisdictions, members of name
bands have been held employees of the hiring establishment. Utah Hotel Co. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 107 Utah 24, 1s P. 2d 467 (1944); Maloney v. Industrial Comm'n, 242 Wis. 65,
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At the other extreme are bands which form an integral part of the establishment which employs them. Such an establishment may directly employ the
musicians, or engage a "contractor," often a band leader, to organize a band for
the specific job. In these cases there is likely to be substantial control exercised
by.the management over hiring and firing, types of music to be performed, and
the manner of performance. As opposed to name-bands, the profit and loss earmark more clearly lies with the establishment, the band leader assuming the
function of a foreman. Consequently, members of non-name bands are generally
regarded as employees of the establishments, rather than of the leader.'
Between the two extremes are bands, such as the one in the EarleRestaurant
case, which are difficult to categorize. On the one hand, this band was a going
concern to the extent that it had been organized some time prior to its engagement with the restaurant, and continued as a unit thereafter. It provided its
own instruments and musical paraphernalia. Furthermore, there was no substantial control exercised by the management over the individual members.
These factors would tend to show that the leader was an independent contractor. On the other hand, the engagement was for a relatively long period; the
profit and loss earmarks were substantially on the management (each member
was paid a salary which was stipulated in the contract of hire, and, so far as
appears, the band leader probably incurred very few, if any, business expenses);
and there is no indication that the band possessed such a distinctive style as
would normally preclude interference in manner of performance and selection of
personnel by the management. 9 However, the district court found the band
leader to be an independent contractor, and the question of his status, apart
from Form B, was not argued on appeal.
In holding the contract admissible to prove that the band members were in
fact employees of the restaurant, the court of appeals expressly relied on the
decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Birminghamv.
Bartels,0 a suit by a dance-hall operator to recover social security taxes assessed against him as an employer of numerous name bands. There, the court
did not question that, apart from the provisions of Form B, the band leader
would have been held an independent contractor. That status, however, was
held to have been changed by Form B's contractual grant to the establishment
9 N.W.

2d 623 (1943). Contra: Unemployment Compensation Comm'n of Wyoming v.
Mathews, 56 Wyo. 479, 1I P. 2d ii (194i); Hill Hotel Co. v. Kenney, 138 Neb. 760, 295
N.W. 397 (1940).

s General Wayne Inn, Inc. v. Rothensies, 47 F. Supp. 391 (Pa., 1942); In re Dellapenta,
261 App. Div. 863, 24 N.Y.S. 2d 748 (I941); Ajello v. SavarinstMgt. Inc., 259 App. Div. 949,
xg N.Y.S. 2d 886 (1940); Boyle v. Mahoney, 92 Conn. 4o4, I03 Atl. 127 (i918); see Palumbo
v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 148 Pa. Super. 289, 25 A. 2d 8o (1942);
Steel Pier Amusement Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n, 127 N.J.L. 154, 21 A.
2d 767 (1941).
9See Transcript of Record, Earle Restaurant, Inc. v. O'Meara, 16o F. 2d 275 (App. D.C.,
1947), and dissent, ibid., at 279.
'0 157 F. 2d 295 (C.C.A. 8th, 1946), rev'd 67 S. Ct. 1547 (1947).
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of the complete right to control. The court drew a distinction between contracts
which merely recite the existence of an employment relationship, and those
which, as here, create such a relationship." In the latter case, the facts that the
exercise of control was unlikely, and that the conduct of the parties actually
remained unchanged despite Form B, were considered irrelevant, except to prove
that the parties had abrogated the contract. This, it was held, they had not
done. The mere failure to exercise control was not inconsistent with an intention
to retain the right to exercise it. Accordingly, the sidemen were found to be the
employees of the dance hall, not of the band leader.
The weight to be given to control provisions in contracts for the purpose of
determining the existence of an employment relationship is far from clear."
Decisions denying the effectiveness of provisions requiring that the work shall be
performed under the employer's direction are frequently based on the finding
that the supervision was intended to be exercised only with respect to the results
to be accomplished rather than the details of performance."3 On the other hand,
where the contract has been held to create the employment relationship, either
control was in fact exercised, 14 or the nature of the contract was such that the
existence of actual control, or a practical power to control, may be inferred.' s
In a third line of cases, the courts often disregard a contract which purports to
divest the hiring party of control, where it is found that he retains, as a practical matter, potential or actual control.' 6 No case has been found, however,
11But cf. In re Roseland Amusement Co. 269 App. Div. 713, 54 N.Y.S. 2d 173 (1945),
where a contract providing that sidemen should be deemed employees of a dance-hall was
the decisive factor in the finding of an employment relationship. See also Claim of Camgros,
264 App. Div. 973, 37 N.Y.S. 2d 204 (1942).
"The Restatement of Agency lists, as one of nine factors to be considered in determining
whether the subject is an employee or independent contractor, the degree of control reserved
under the contract. Rest.,Agency § 220 (2)(a). However, since a servant is defined as one
who is "subject to the other's control," ibid., § 220(I), it could be argued that a contract providing for complete control is conclusive.
"3United Gas Improvement Co. v. Larsen, 182 Fed. 620 (C.C.A. 3d, 1g1o); McGrath v.
City of St. Louis, 215 Mo. 19, 114 S.W. 611 (i9o8); Miller v. Merritt &Co., 211 Pa. 127, 6o
Atl. 508 (igo5); United States v. Driscoll, 96 U.S. 421 (1877).
'4 Williams v. National Cash Register Co. 157 Ky. 836, 164 S.W. 112 (1914); Chicago,
R.I. &P. R. Co. v. Bennett, 36 Okla. 358, 128 Pac. 705 (1912).
' Such an assumption is reasonable where the control provisions are elaborate. See Kelley
v. Delaware, L. &W. R. Co., 270 Pa. 426, 113 Atl. 419 (1921); Aarnes v. Great Northern Ry.
Co., 129 Minn. 467, 152 N.W. 866 (1915); B. Schade Brewing Co. v. Chicago, M. & P.S. Ry.
Co., 79 Wash. 651, 140 Pac. 897 (1914); Charles T. Derr Const. Co. v. Gelruth, 29 Okla. 538,
12o Pac. 253 (1911); Smith v. City of Seattle, 2o Wash. 613, 56 Pac. 389 (1899).
16Salt Lake Tribune Pub. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 99 Utah 259, 102 P. 2d 307 (1940).
See Wolfe, Determination of Employer-Employee Relationships in Social Legislation, 41
Col. L. Rev. 1oi5, 1025 et seq. (1941).
Courts likewise frown on attempts to camouflage employment relations by drafting instruments purporting to create other relations. "Lessee": S. A. Gerrard Co. v. Industrial Accident
Comm'n, 17 Cal. 2d 411, 110 P. 2d 377 (1941); Comm. v. Weinfeld's, Inc., 305 Mass. io8,
25 N.E. 2d 198 (194o); National Tunnel & Mines Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 99 Utah 39,
102 P. 2d 5o8 (1940); see In the Matter of Edward F. Reichelt, 21 N.L.R.B. 262 (1940). But
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which holds that a bare contractual right to control, without more, is sufficient
to establish the master-servant relationship.;7
The logic of the Bartelsand Earle Restaurant decisions is impregnable only if
some magical significance be imparted to the oft-repeated phrase that "the right
to control, and not its exercise"' 8 determines the employment relationship. If
one looks behind the literal words of this formula to its function, these holdings,
even granting the validity of the much-maligned control test, become dubious.
The "right to control" concept may be viewed as a device to protect the integrity of the control test. 9 Without it, the test would break down wherever
positive evidence of control is lacking. The formula may be said to have been
developed in recognition of the facts that i) in an age of specialization, many
types of employees may function with a minimum amount of employer supervision, and 2) latent, unexercised power to control may have as strong a coercive
value as direct supervision. This rationale is particularly applicable to cases involving vicarious tort liability, where the courts have rightly felt that recovery
should not be made to depend on what is, from the plaintiff's standpoint, a mere
accident of affirmative supervision. Therefore, in the absence of specific reservations by the employer,'2 or in theface of specific negations of the power to control,2' courts have examined the total picture to see if, apart from its exercise,
the right exists. This use of the test may be contrasted with its application in
the instant cases. In the Bartels case the total picture emphatically negates the
possibility of control by the establishment. Hence, the contract can provide no
more information on this point than is already known. EarleRestaurant,Inc.
cf. Lafferyv. United States Gypsum Co.,83 Kan. 349, iii.

Pac. 498 (igio). "Vendee": Cream-

eries of America, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 98 Utah 571, 102 P. 2d 300 (194o); Beatrice
Creamery Co. v. State Industrial Comn'n, 174 Okla. 101, 49 P. 2d 1094 (1935). Compare In

the Matter of Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 9 N.L.E..B. 1262 (1938). But cf. Mountain Meadow
Creameries v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 25 Cal. App. 2d 123, 76 P. 2d 724 (1938). "Partner": Montello Granite Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 227 Wis. 170,278 N.W. 391 (1938). "Licensee": California Employment Stabilization Comm'n v. Matcovich, 74 Cal. App. 2d 398, i68
P. 2d 702 (1946).
17 This seeming paucity of cases in an otherwise plethorically litigated field should not
shock the reader in view of the fact that control provisions are usually inserted at the behest
of the one using the services, and not, as here, the one providing them.
8 Murrelle v. Industrial Comm'n, 382 Ill.
i28, 134, 46 N.E. 2d 1007, oio (g943); Bernat
v. Star-Chronicle Publishing Co., 84 S.W. 2d 429, 432 (Mo. App., 1935); McDermott's Case,
283 Mass. 74, 77, 186 N.E. 231, 233 (1933); United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 42 Ariz. 422, 433, 26 P. 2d 1o12, Yo=6 (1933).
x9Some would consider this a too charitable view. ".... [While] the sop thrown to the employer, that he at least has the 'right to control' the work, may serve to keep the principle
verbally intact, it fails to conceal the fact that it is obvious rationalism." Steffen, Independent
Contractor and the Good Life, 2 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 5o, 507 (1935). "The control test seems
to fit itself too readily into an ex post facto determination.... In view of the fact that, relationship once determined, control would follow ... the possibility of reasoning in a vicious
circle is apparent." Leidy, Salesmen as Independent Contractors, 28 Mich. L. Rev. 365, 377-78
(1930).
2

°See cases cited in note 18, supra.

21

See cases cited in note 16, supra.
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v. O'Meara presents a more difficult problem, since the relationship of the
parties was not free from ambiguity. If the facts were thoroughly equivocal, the
contract might have provided a convenient weight with which to tip the scales
in favor of an employment relationship. The appellate courts in both cases,
however, chose to treat the agreement not in terms of its evidentiary potency,
but rather as presenting a problem in the law of contracts. To do this, however,
allows private parties to frustrate statutory schemes, and places upon outsiders
who wish to attack the validity of the arrangement the burden of proving either
a contemporaneous parol understanding that the hiring party shall not exercise
control, or that the parties, by their subsequent behavior, have abrogated the
control provisions-almost impossible tasks.
That this problem is not an imaginary one is demonstrated in the Earle
Restaurantcase. Setting aside, for the moment, the collective nature of Form B,
and viewing the contract as merely an arrangement between the actual signatories, the result of the decision is to substitute the establishment for the bandleader as plaintiff's employer, without the plaintiff's consent or knowledge. If
the essence of the employment relation is consensual, such a result is dearly
unsound, and so the cases seem to hold.- A complicating feature, however, is
the fact that the Form B provisions were devised by the plaintiff's union, and
incorporated into its by-laws. It could therefore be argued that, as a collective
bargaining contract, it bound the plaintiff regardless of notice. 23 This raises the
problem of the scope of the union's power to bind individual members. The
recent tendency to impart a normative24 effect to collective agreements has
severely limited the application of many common-law principles. Collective
-"But employment, like any other contract, presupposes understanding. The new relation cannot be thrust upon the servant without knowledge or consent." Cardozo, J., in Murray
v. Union Ry. Co. of N.Y.C., 229 N.Y. 110, 113, 127 N.E. 907 (1920); Wilson & Co., Inc.
v. Locke, 5o F. 2d 8r (C.C.A. 2d, i93i); Standard Oil Co. v. Andrews, 212 U.S. 215 (19o9).
But cf. Tokash v. General Baking Co., 349 Mo. 767, 163 S.W. 2d 554 (1942); Rest., Agency
§ 220, Comment (2)(i) (1933). Perhaps this "rule" assumes a certainty in the law of inde-

pendent contractor which is unwarranted. "A contractor may go forth in the morning proud
in his independence and return at nightfall a servant, some court having found in the employer
such a measure of control.., as no truly independent contractor could countenance."
Steffen, op. cit. supra note ig, at 502.
'3 This was, in fact, the holding in the instant case. However, the court took the position
that the plaintiff was bound, not by the action of the Federation, but by that of the booking
agency which negotiated the contract, and which the court thought was plaintiff's "colleclective bargaining representative." Earle Restaurant, Inc. v. O'Meara, 16o F. 2d 275, 276-77
(App. D.C., i947). On the other hand, the defendant thought the plaintiff to be bound by
her "agent," the band leader. Ibid., dissent, at 278. Both views obscure the essential issue of
the power of a union to act as a gigantic risk-shifter.

4

See Lewellyn v. Fleming,

i54 F.

2d 211

(C.C.A. ioth, 1946); J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB,

321 U.S. 332 (1944); 1 Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining § 172 (1940); Hoenig-

er, The Individual Employment Contract under the Wagner Act: I, zo Fordham L. Rev. 14,
35 (1941); Fisher, Trade Unions under the Wagner Act,

Collective Acts as Distinguished from Contracts,

27

21

Ore. L. Rev. 37, 5*(1941); Duguit,

Yale LJ. 753 (i918).
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agreements which destroy seniority ratings,25 abolish jobs,26 impose a check-off

of union dues on the wages of both union and non-union workmen,27 and even
impose affirmative obligations on the employees as individuals, have been held
valid.2a The only limiting factor has been the requirement that the union act in
good faith and without discrimination against minority groups. 2 9 But in cases
like the instant one, courts might plausibly be reluctant to allow the operation
of collective bargaining to foreclose common law remedies to individual union
members.30 Furthermore, the possibility that union arrangements which tamper
with fundamentally consensual relationships are actually beyond its power as a
bargaining agent should not be overlooked. At any rate, the court's failure to
discuss, or even realize, its extension of collective agreements into a new field is
unfortunate.
Subsequent to the EarleRestaurantdecision, the Supreme Court reversed the
circuit court's holding in the Bartels case.3 ' In a reassertion of its "mischiefremedy" doctrine, 32 the court denied that the "right to control" was determina2S Llewellyn v. Fleming, 15 4 F. 2d 211 (C.C.A. ioth, 1946); Day v. Louisville & N. R. Co.,
295 Ky. 679, 175 S.W. 2d 347 (1943); Florestauo v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 198 Minn. 203,
269 N.W. 407 (1936).
26O'Keefe v. Local 463 of United Ass'n of Plumbers and Gas Fitters, 277 N.Y. 300, 14 N.E.
2d 77 (1938); Hartley v. Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers
and Station Employees, 283 Mich. 201, 277 N.W. 885 (x938).
27Greenwald v. Chiarella, i8 L.R.R.M. 2218 (1946) (semble); but cf. Braddon v. Three

Point Coal Corp., 288 Ky. 734, 157 S.W. 2d 349 (1941).
29 The following cases have held employees bound by collective agreements not to compete:
Western Maryland Dairy v. Chenowith, i8o Md. 236, 23 A. 2d 66o (1942); Western-United
Dairy Co. v. Nash, 293 Ill. App. 62, 12 N.E. 2d 47 (1937); Whiting Milk Cos. v. Grondin,
282 Mass. 41, 184 N.E. 379 (1933); Whiting Milk Cos. v. O'Connell, 277 Mass. 570, 179 N.E
i69 (193i).

29Betts v. Easley, x6i Kan. 459, I6g P. 2d 831 (1946); Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.
Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); O'Keefe v. Local 463 of United Ass'n of Plumbers and Gas Fitters,
277 N.Y. 300, 14 N.E. 2d 77 (1938); Hartley v. Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship
Clerks, Freight Handlers and Station Employees, 283 Mich. 201, 277 N.W. 885 (1938); Cameron v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees and Moving Picture Operators,
ii8 N.J. Eq. 11, 176 Atl. 692 (1935); Burke v. Monumental Division No. 52, Brotherhood of
Locomotive Engineers, 273 Fed. 707 (D.C. Md., 1919).

3oExculpatory clauses in employment contracts purporting to exempt the employer from
liability for negligence are invalid. Johnston v. Fargo, 184 N.Y. 379, 77 N.E. 388 (19o6);
Brant v. Chicago & A.R. Co., 294 Ill. 6o6, 128 N.E. 732 (1920); Rest., Contracts § 575(I)(a)

(1933). Where the state of employment had no workmen's compensation, a contract providing
for determination of compensation under the act of another state was held to be against public
policy. Standard Pipe Line Co. v. Burnett, 188 Ark. 491, 66 S.W. 2d 637 (1933). Compare
The Henry S. Grove, 22 F. 2d 444 (Md., 1927). But cf. Western Union Telegraph Co. v.
Tompa, 51 F. 2d 1032 (C.C.A. 2d, 1931); Wells Fargo & Co. v. Taylor, 254 U.S. 175 (1920); cf.
also Michels v. City of St. Paul, 193 Minn. 215, 258 N.W. x62 (i935).
31Bartels v. Birmingham, 67 S. Ct. 1547 (i947).

32See United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704 (1947); Grace v. Magruder, 148 F. 2d 679 (App.
D.C., 1945), cert. den. 326 U.S. 720 (i945); NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S.
1i1(1944).
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tive of the employment relation for the purposes of social legislation. Employees,
said the court, "are those who as a matter of economic reality are dependent
upon the business to which they render service."13 In view of this decision, the
Earle Restaurant case may no longer be considered as authoritative in federal
courts. But state courts clinging to the control test may still be embarrassed by
the conundrums which it poses.
That the broader field of inquiry announced by the Supreme Court is more
fruitful than the control test is certainly made manifest by the musician cases.
The difficulty of determining what indicia of control are significant is particularly pointed in this field, and accounts for most of the conflicting decisions.
While the right to hire and discharge personnel is a strong indication of control,
a finding that such right does or does not exist is likely to be speculative because
it is so rarely exercised. But many other kinds of control normally exercised are
nearly, if not totally, irrelevant to the issues of liability for insurance payments
and workmen's compensation coverage. Among the factors stressed by courts
have been control of the kind of music played,34 the duration of intermissions,35
routes of ingress and egress to and from the band-stand, 6 requirements of
dress,37 and rules governing the deportment of musicians in the establishment. 8
The illogic of the test is highlighted by a decision holding a theater employing
an animal act exempt from the unemployment insurance tax on the grounds
that the theater "could not order a dog to jump through a hoop instead of ride
on top of a pony. . . ."39 This, it is submitted, is a non sequitur. It, along with

the Bartels and Earle Restaurant cases, indicates the fundamental fallacy of
blind reliance on the control test without further inquiry as to whether, in a
particular situation, the application of the test will define the true entrepreneurial unit. Perhaps, in the vast majority of cases, economic reality follows
control. But in the more difficult situations, ambiguities would seem best resolved by focusing on the economic realities directly, rather than through the
oblique mirror of the control formula.
33Bartels v. Birmingham, 67 S. Ct. 1547, 155o (1947). Factors to be considered along with
control were stated to be "permanency of the relation, the skill required, the investment in
the facilities for work and opportunities for profit and loss... ." Ibid.

34 Steel Pier Amusement Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n,
154, 21

A. 2d 767

(1941).

Contra: People v. Grier, 53 Cal. App. 2d 841,

128

P. 2d

127

N.J.L

207 (1942).

35Palumbo v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 148 Pa. Super, 289, 25 A.
2d So (942). Contra: In re Earle, 262 App. Div. 789, 27 N.Y.S. 2d 3Io (1941), aff'd 286 N.Y.

61o, 36 N.E. 2d 453

(1941).

36 Claim of Camgros,
37

2d

264 App. Div. 973,37 N.Y.S. 2d 204 (1942).

Palumbo v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 148 Pa. Super. 289,

So (1942).
38Appeal of Firm Amusement Corp., 264 App. Div. 973,37 N.Y.S.

2d 204

(1942).

25

A.

Contra:

Hill Hotel Co. v. Kinney, 138 Neb. 76o, 295 N.W. 397 (1940).
39In re Radio City Music Hall Corp., 262 App. Div. 593,597,3x N.Y.S. 2d 284, 288 (194I).

